


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REVIEW OF THE WORLD SITUATION

(PREFACE TO CIA-49 SERIES)



CIA 0-49

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REVIEW OF THE WORLD SITUATION AS IT RELATES TO THE SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES

PREFACE

The following is issued as a general introduction to CIA-49 Series "Review of the World Situation as it Relates to the Security of the United States." It is intended to describe the point of view from which the CIA-49 Series will be prepared. It is also concerned to identify types of security problem in order to set up points of reference for the analysis of global developments in relation to the continuing security interests of the United States.

Note: This review has not been coordinated with the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Army, Navy, and the Air Force.

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**REVIEW OF THE WORLD SITUATION AS IT RELATES TO THE SECURITY
OF THE UNITED STATES**

1. A check of CIA-48 Series shows that terms like "US security interests," "national security," "threats to US security," have been used in so many different connections that their meaning has become blurred and they are losing their usefulness for intelligence analysis. Obviously not everything that is put forward as a security interest can have equally valid claim to consideration as such; but the way the terms are presently used makes it difficult to distinguish real from apparent problems.

2. The following general remarks are pertinent:

a. At the present time, the distribution of power in the world is such that the US and the USSR are alone capable of developing and maintaining modern power structures.

b. Other states, or groups of states, though they may formerly have had this capability, must now be considered as being on the side lines of a bipolar power situation.

c. A modern power structure requires the presence and the coordination of at least the following components:

(1) Possession or control of adequate supplies of mechanical energy—coal, water power, petroleum, etc.

(2) Possession, control of, or ability to obtain by seizure, the raw materials needed to maintain basic heavy industries (iron and steel) and to maintain the social organization of the state (light service industries, distributive and communication systems, etc.).

(3) Manpower, both quantitatively as a supplement to the energy resources of the state and qualitatively in the sense of widespread technical and managerial skills.

(4) A social structure which links the habits and skills of its members into an effective "Going Concern." This "Going Concern" must develop a productive process capable on demand of providing surpluses beyond consumption so that there will be an unused margin of production available as military force in readiness. In addition, given the world-wide distribution of resources and markets, a "Going Concern" is further strengthened by being part of a system of international commerce.

3. Neither the US nor the USSR possesses these attributes of power in an absolute form. In neither have the components been developed to the maximum possible; in neither have the components been fully interlocked in a system of maximum power effectiveness. Present power relations between the US and the USSR are affected by differentials in these respects; and one of the continuing security interests of each state is to preserve a favorable differential and modify an unfavorable one. The differentials favorable to the US are qualitative manpower, developed and reserve mechanical energy, and the superior effectiveness of its productive process. The differentials

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favorable to the USSR are quantitative manpower, superior military force in being, and the dictatorial controls by which it can restrict consumption and thus acquire a margin of resources for ready use as actual power in spite of a comparatively inferior productive process.

4. Of the nations that were previously able to deploy some or all of these components with relative effectiveness, none can now be considered capable of regaining and maintaining this status purely by its own exertions. It is only Western Europe as a group of nations that can now be considered capable of attaining this status within a reasonable period of time. Even this group would require a period of subsidy before its existing components of power could be reintegrated.

5. These remarks about the nature of a modern power structure suggest that the security problems that arise from the power relations of the US and the USSR come in part from the differentials between two major power structures and from the inevitable efforts each makes to alter these differentials in its own favor, and in part from the fact that formerly integrated components of power are in process of being pulled into new alignments. The number of previous centers of power, whose positions have been undermined and whose relations to the two new poles of power have not yet been clearly stabilized, strongly suggests that the security problems of the US and the USSR do not primarily lie in their direct relation to each other but rather in the relations of each to third states, group of states, or geographical regions.

6. Situations, in which security problems arise and by which, consequently, security interests appear to be threatened, can be classified under three headings: Geographical, Sociological, and Domestic. This classification must be regarded as essentially theoretical and useful primarily as an analytical tool.

Description of the Basic Categories.

7. *Geographical*: this covers the relations in space and time of the two major power structures to each other and to third states. The security interests that specifically arise in these connections are—

a. Strategic—access of each power to the territory of the other; control of locations which facilitate or deny such access; control of areas adjacent to the territory of the other in order that actual military force can be offensively projected.

b. Maintenance of power potential—control of or access to sources of raw materials and mechanical energy.

c. Positive additions to power potential—the expansion of political influence in intermediate areas in order to control or obtain access to the resources of other states. The USSR, by means of international Communism, has placed great reliance on this method and pushes it to the point of seeking to establish absolute institutional control. This is in sharp contrast to the US, which is limited in this respect to the control that can be produced by indirect economic, commercial, and political influences.

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8. *Sociological*: this covers the relations of the two major power structures to each other and to third states in terms of the psychological reactions of individuals and groups and of the possible effects of these reactions on the social organization of the states involved. Since distance, artificial barriers, and cultivated antagonisms insulate the individuals, groups, and social institutions of the US and USSR from significant mutual influences, sociological security problems develop primarily in those intermediate regions where competitive influence of the US and the USSR is still possible. Security interests arise in this category in connection with—

a. The development of mass attitudes favorable or unfavorable to the objectives and policies and relative power positions of the two major power structures.

b. The organization of the attitudes of politically effective groups in ways which identify the interests of these groups with the objectives and policies of one or the other of the two major power structures.

c. The bringing of influence to bear on key policy-making individuals for the purpose of persuading them that their responsibilities and objectives can best be served if they are coordinated with the objectives and policies of one of the major power structures.

Generally speaking, a US or a USSR security interest develops in the states of the intermediate region in connection with the extent to which such states identify or can be persuaded to identify their interests with what are understood to be the purposes of the US or the USSR. The desirable end product of protecting a security interest of this type is clearly to improve a relative power position by assuring the availability of the power resources of an intermediate state.

9. *Domestic Social Organization*: this covers all internal US and USSR problems connected with the maintenance of their respective societies as "Going Concerns." Their relative power positions are directly related to the productive capabilities and stability of their domestic social organizations. US security interests within this category are beyond the province of this analysis; but their existence is clearly indicated by the attention which both the US and the USSR give to the possibility of tensions developing in the social structure of the other.

10. The preceding definitions suggest that the security interests of the US and the USSR have not developed in isolation and of their own accord, but are closely related and simultaneously arise out of the global power situation in which the two states equally are involved. Theoretically, this is the correct analytical approach to the problem of national security in a world where power has become essentially bipolarized. However, when particular situations are examined, some significant differences appear in the basic security problems of the US and the USSR. These differences are noted as follows:

a. US security interests are widely dispersed in both the geographical and sociological categories. Geographically they have developed along the entire perimeter of the continent of Europe-Asia. Sociologically they have to be protected in a wide variety of

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circumstances (democratic, monarchical, class conflicts, feudal absolutism, nationalism, and imperialism). In relation to individual states, the democratic process tends to disperse these interests through all social levels and makes it theoretically undesirable to identify them with the maintenance of any particular social group, even though in present fact identification with center and middle class groups is politically normal.

b. USSR security interests are concentrated in both the above respects. Geographically they develop in areas contiguous to the USSR. Sociologically they are concentrated at the same social level in each state—the mass of industrial and agricultural workers that feels itself prevented from exercising the degree of political and social power commensurate with its strength and aspirations.

c. In addition to the comparative ease of guarding security interests thus concentrated, the USSR—through international Communist activities—is able to conduct offensive operations against the dispersed security interests of the US. Such operations, as for example those that have been and are being carried out by the Communist Party in France, do not represent the positive protection of basic USSR security interests. They can be abandoned without any immediate adverse effect on the present power position of the USSR. They do, however, represent an effort to undermine a US security interest and, to the extent that they succeed, they improve the relative power position of the USSR.

11. There are so many points of unbalance in the present power conflict between the US and the USSR that security problems seem to arise in bewilderingly various and contradictory forms. It is consequently desirable to try to define a minimum number of basic US security problems in a way that will be comprehensive enough to pull together into a recognizable long-term pattern the short-term problems that develop in geographically scattered areas and sociologically diverse situations. Once established, these basic problems can be used as points of reference for analyzing international situations in relation to US national security; and a security interest that cannot be convincingly shown to derive from one or more of these basic problems should have its validity as a security interest challenged.

12. Three basic problems in US security can be thus stated:

a. The geographical problem of keeping the still widely dispersed power resources of Europe and Asia from being drawn together into a single Soviet power structure with a uniformly communist social organization.

b. The sociological problem of persuading the peoples and the political authorities of states in the intermediate regions that their political aspirations and security interests can be satisfactorily identified with those of the US. This problem also includes that of developing a general conviction that aspirations will be forwarded and security protected simultaneously with the protection of US interests.

c. The domestic problem of maintaining the social structure of the US intact and adaptable. This involves not only the maintenance of internal stability but the

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maintenance of those external contacts with sources of raw materials and mechanical energy that are essential to the total US productive process.

A Detailed Examination of These Problems.

13. The geographical security problem created by the possible consolidation of the power resources of Europe and Asia under a single authority has been theoretically discussed for over thirty years. Only the present bipolarity of power in the world convincingly sets the stage for this possibility to become a reality. It is now necessary to assume the beginnings of such a trend. Although the focal center of the USSR power structure is still located west of the Ural Mountains, subsidiary centers are being developed in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and the Far East. The linking of these centers into a modern productive system is presently limited by underdeveloped transportation and inadequate skills; but these limitations cannot be considered as final and absolute. The present significance lies in the fact that these subsidiary centers are located so that they constitute regional preponderances of power in areas contiguous to the USSR and thus provide the means to maintain a general process of continental expansion. They form, in fact, part and parcel of the methodical step by step process by which a continental land power extends and consolidates its authority.

14. In contrast, the focal center of the US power structure lies compactly within US continental limits and, on a world map, is situated as if on an island. US power cannot expand beyond this center by simple territorial accretion. To be used effectively in terms of global power relations, US power must be projected across water and through the air.

15. The present disposition of US and USSR power does not permit the effective projection of US power into regions contiguous to the USSR. The USSR, on the other hand, can continue to extend the perimeter of the area in which its power is effective and in which its institutions can be established. Each such extension, by preparing the ground for a fuller development of USSR power potential, modifies in some degree the balance of power relations between the US and the USSR. The natural geographical limit of such a process is the Eurasian littoral, for further movement would imply the conversion of Soviet land-air power into sea-air power. Since the US and the USSR are not in direct territorial contact, except at the Bering Strait, the geographical security interest of each is not at the moment essentially a product of their adjacency. It lies in the relation of each to third or intermediate regions, and consists of the comparative influence which the US and the USSR can exert in such regions in relation to their power positions and their estimated strategic requirements. These intermediate regions consist of Western Europe, the Mediterranean, the Near and Middle East, the Indian Peninsula, Southeast Asia, China, and the offshore Asiatic islands; in short, those regions of Eurasia to which US power has access by means of sea and air communications and which cannot, under present conditions, be readily incorporated into the USSR power structure.

16. The pressure of the USSR to develop its power structure to these natural limits will probably be of long duration. The method will probably be that inherent in the

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strategy of a traditional land power—slow expansion by the political absorption of immediately adjacent areas, not leaping ahead militarily into advanced but geographically isolated positions. The USSR can and will, however, seek to prepare the ground for ultimate geographical expansion by generating sociological security problems in areas beyond its actual reach, where US interests can be threatened without the need to commit actual power to the operation. The tactics of such operations can be considerably varied, as is illustrated by the use made of the Communist Party in France and of indigenous nationalist movements in the colonial areas of the Far East. The objectives of such operations do not, under present conditions, represent the positive protection of USSR security interests. They represent generalized threats to US security interests; threats from which advantages are derived only indirectly and in the long run.

17. These same intermediate regions also coincide with the recently disintegrated power structure of Western Europe and the strategic control points by which European states formerly projected their authority and maintained colonial and semicolonial systems as additions to their power resources. Since many of the essential components of this power structure—the industrial plant, the raw materials, the human resources—still exist, an essential issue develops between the US and the USSR in connection with the ultimate redistribution of these components. Specifically, will they be divided between and incorporated in the US and USSR power structures? will they be reintegrated as a Western European power structure with colonial appendages? will the colonial and semicolonial areas split off and minor power structures develop along the Eurasian littoral, with centers in Western Europe, the Middle East, and the Far East? or will some pattern of international relations emerge that includes all of these possibilities in a sort of mixed bag? The only one of these possibilities that is of basic importance is the one which would divide power finally between the US and the USSR. Diverse power structures on the coastal rim of Eurasia—even if not responsive in the long run to US influence—would not in themselves be a threat to US security, provided they could and would remain unresponsive to USSR pressure. The only continuing threat is the steady expansion and consolidation of the USSR power structure.

18. The basic US security problem of a geographical kind is to deny the USSR final and irreversible access to the Eurasian littoral, and simultaneously to maintain US access to strategically significant sectors of that littoral. The strategic significance of various sectors will almost certainly be modified as US and USSR short-term objectives are realized or fail to be realized. It is for this reason that it is possible to estimate that one or other sector has superior claims to attention and to the allocation of US resources; or that power should be positively projected at one point, temporarily withheld at another, and used at still another merely to the degree called for by a holding action. Such judgments, however, do not alter in any essential respect the persistent geographical security problem.

19. The basic sociological security problem must be regarded as subordinate to the basic geographical problem, though in no way less important. The Eurasian littoral is

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not only a disputed geographical region between two major power structures. It has a social and political reality of its own and, as far as circumstances permit, it pursues its own ends. It is presently engaged in dealing with civil conflicts both vertically between social groups within individual states and horizontally between the colonial areas of the East and the colonial authorities of the West. The resolution of these conflicts is pertinent to the relations of the US and the USSR with the region and hence to their relative power positions. The sociological security problem lies, therefore, in the manner and shape of the settlement reached in the intermediate regions, and inevitably produces both US and USSR efforts to determine the character of that settlement. It is probable that the geographical interests of the US cannot be adequately protected in the long run unless sociological interests are simultaneously protected. It is certain that the sociological interests cannot be guarded if the geographical interests cannot be protected. The first point is illustrated by the course of events in the Far East; the second by the speed with which Eastern Europe was drawn in the Soviet orbit.

20. The breakdown of the power structure of Western Europe has been accompanied by a breakdown of the institutional structure of the entire Eurasian littoral. The region must accordingly be regarded as in dispute sociologically as well as geographically, and US security interests in both categories are mutually supporting as well as open to simultaneous attack. That the sociological security interest is of major significance is indicated by the violence with which the US and the USSR clash in the intangible and uncharted field of human reactions and can be measured by the resources that have been assigned to the conduct of this "cold war."

21. The comprehensive character of the "cold war" makes the sociological security problems of the US more immediately significant than the geographical, except in a limited number of well-defined areas—notably Germany and Austria, and Greece, Turkey, and Iran. Generally speaking, a sociological security problem can claim a higher priority the further removed it is from the focal center of USSR power. Thus, in Greece, Turkey, and Iran, the sociological interest can be given attention at the present time only to the extent that it directly supports the geographical. In France, Spain, and Italy, the two types of interest begin to come into more equal balance. In China and Southeast Asia, where the threat to the geographical interest is remote even though definable, and where time and circumstances permit the development of counteractions, the sociological problem is paramount. Adequate handling of sociological interests can have the effect of retarding and perhaps can even prevent the ultimate posing of a blunt and unacceptable threat to a basic geographical security interest.

22. Reference has not been made to regions that lie outside the area of fundamental US-USSR power conflict—notably Latin America and Africa south of the Sahara. In both regions, a comprehensive sociological problem admittedly exists, but, from the US point of view, it is not linked with a geographical security interest in any degree comparable with the one which has developed in Eurasia. These regions are as remote

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from the influence of actual USSR power as is Central Asia from the influence of actual US power, and no basic security interest is presently developing in either. Probably, in analyzing the general significance of these regions to the global power position of the US, some such phrase as *security desiderata* should be used instead of *security interest*.

23. If the categories of security problem here described are used as points of reference for the analysis of current situations, it is considered that more generally acceptable estimates can be made of—

a. the comparative importance of current situations and of the immediate security interests that they touch upon;

b. the priorities of attention, decision, and action called for;

c. the mutually interlocking development of sociological and geographical problems. For the purposes of the intelligence analyses to be made in CIA-49 Series, it will be assumed that the basic geographical security problem is the fundamental one; that the basic sociological security problem may be the more pressingly important; and that neither is separable from the other or from the basic domestic security problem.

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